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In this paper, we explore the link between stress in the domestic financial sector and the capital flight
faced by countries in the 2008-9 global crisis. Both the timing of emergence of internal financial stress
in developing economies, and the size of the peak-trough declines in the stock price indices was comparable
to that in high income countries, indicating that there was no decoupling, even before Lehman Brothers’
demise. Deleveraging of OECD positions seemed to dominate the patterns of capital flows during
the crisis. While high income countries on average saw net capital inflows and net portfolio inflows
during the crisis quarters, compared to net outflows for developing economies, the indicators of banking
sector stress were higher for high income economies on average than for developing economies. Internal
and external distress during crisis was closely interlinked with common underlying causes of both
the severity of stress during the crisis and the recovery. External vulnerabilities were important in
both phases, and higher international reserves did not insulate countries from stress.
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The financial crisis that started in the US in 2007 spread rapidly to the rest of the world and resulted 
in the Great Recession. By mid 2009, the financial crisis was over in most countries, although the 
evidence on the recession and the tenuous recovery is less clear. In this paper, we aim to understand the 
spread of financial distress from the US to the rest of the world as well as the determinants of the severity 
of financial stress and recovery. We distinguish between external and internal financial stress, defined 
respectively as pressure of capital outflows and pressure inducing declining stock markets, and expanding 
CBs balance sheets. We ask to what extent the internal financial stress was driven by outflows of capital. 
Next, we examine the macroeconomic factors that could explain the differences between countries in 
terms of the severity of internal and external financial stress they experienced during the crisis. We also 
ask to what extent the differences in the pattern of recovery from financial stress could be explained by 
the differences in pre-existing fundamentals (rather than endogenous policy responses).  
A growing body of literature seeks to examine the cross-country determinants of the incidence of the 
crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2010 a, b, c; Blanchard et. al., 2010; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010; Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2010; Beckman et. al., 2009, Giannone et. al., 2010). We make three contributions to this 
literature. First, while most studies focus on real macroeconomic variables, particularly GDP growth, or 
on a combination of real and financial variables, we focus narrowly on the severity of financial stress, as 
it was the main ‘shock’ in the recent crisis. The real impact of the financial crisis would depend not only 
on the size of the shock but also on the endogenous policy responses and on the real financial linkages 
within the economy. By focusing on the financial sector stress only, we seek to determine the 
macroeconomic conditions or linkages that determined the susceptibility of countries to the shock. 
Second, the emerging consensus narrative on the spread of the crisis holds that the financial crisis spread 
from the US, first to the high income countries through financial sector linkages and later to emerging 
markets, which seemed to have ‘decoupled’ until capital fled these economies in the wake of the Lehman 
Bankruptcy filing on September 15
th, 2008. We examine the validity of this narrative by examining the 
timing of the emergence of financial stress for both high-income and developing economies. Finally, we 
contribute to the literature by examining the determinants of financial recovery, as well as of financial 
stress.  
The next section describes the indicators of internal and external financial stress and looks at the 
timing of the emergence of financial stress and the relationship between external and internal stress. 
Section 3 deals with the determinants of financial stress and section 4 with the determinants of financial 
recovery. Section 5 concludes.    
II.  Internal and external financial stress during the crisis 
II.1  Measuring internal and external financial stress  
Our measures of external financial stress are designed to capture the pressure of capital outflows. 
They include: 
(1)  Net Capital Inflows Reversals
2 (or D. Net Capital Inflows): This variable is the difference 
between net capital inflows during the crisis quarter(s) and the average net capital inflows 
during 2007, normalized by 2007 GDP. The reason for looking at the difference between crisis 
quarter net capital inflows and the 2007 values is that in non-crisis periods, the direction of net 
capital inflows may also reflect equilibrium factors like the age-dependency ratio (relative to 
the rest of the world). The 2007 average net capital inflows control for these.    
(2)  Net Portfolio Inflow Reversals (or D. Net Portfolio Inflows): This variable is defined as the 
difference between net portfolio inflows during crisis quarter(s) and the average net capital 
inflows during 2007, normalized by 2007 GDP.  
(3)  The peak exchange market pressure index (EMP). The EMP is defined as the percentage 
depreciation in SDR exchange rate plus the fall in SDR value of foreign exchange reserves 
(less gold), normalized by the monetary base. Higher values of EMP denote pressure of 
outflows. The EMP is computed using monthly data and the peaks are those obtained since 
January 2008.   
 
Internal Financial stress is measured by the following three variables: 
(1) Peak-trough fall in banking or financial sector equity index 
(2) Peak-trough fall in a general equity index 
(3) Increase in central bank’s assets as a percentage of GDP between 2007 and 2009. 
3  
Our sample consists of 107 countries, which is the maximum number of countries for which data on  
at least one financial stress indicator is available, after removing from the universe of countries, those 
with populations of less than a million (latest available figures), those that were classified as offshore 
                                                 
2 Note that this definition of net capital inflows reversals differs from the commonly used definition in the 
literature, which defines a reversal as a ‘large’ switch from net inflows to net outflows.  
3 Where 2009 values were not available, the 2008 values were used. The correlation between this variable and 
an alternative version - the absolute change between 2009 and 2007 central bank assets normalized by 2007 GDP - 
is 0.7. Moreover, the results in Table 6, on the determinants of financial stress do not change when using this 
alternative version of internal stress measure.  financial centers or tax havens and USA. We define ‘high income’ countries as those that are classified by 
World Bank as high income (OECD or non-OECD), except Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel.
4 These 
three and all other countries are referred to as ‘low and middle income’ countries or ‘developing’ 
countries. We refer to 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 as crisis quarters, because these were the quarters where the 
stress measures peaked for most countries. Table 1 lists, for each quarter from 2007Q1 to 2010Q3, the 
number of countries that saw their banking sector equity indices or stock market indices bottom in that 
quarter, the number of countries that saw the lowest net capital inflows or net portfolio inflows relative to 
2007 averages in that quarter and the number of countries that saw their EMP peak (since 2008 Jan) in 
that quarter.  49 out of the 50 countries for which we have data saw their bank equity indices bottom in 
either 2008Q4 or 2009Q1, and 58 out of the 62 countries saw their stock market indices bottom in these 
crisis quarters. The peak reversals in net capital inflows or net portfolio inflows were less concentrated, 
but 31 countries saw these flows trough in one of the crisis quarters. 61 out of the 107 countries for which 
we have data, saw their exchange market pressure peak in either 2008Q4 or 2009Q1. Having defined 
2008Q4 and 2009Q1 as crisis periods, we focus on net capital inflow reversals and net portfolio inflow 
reversals during each of these two quarters as indicators of crisis severity, in addition to the other stress 
indicators defined in this section.  Throughout the paper, net capital outflows and net portfolio outflows 
refer to their values relative to 2007 average and expressed as percentage of 2007 GDP.  
II.2.  Summary Statistics of financial stress indicators: 
The average emerging economy saw a reversal of capital inflows during the crisis, and the net capital 
outflows exceeded the outflows of portfolio investment. The peak to trough percentage decline in 
stock prices was about the same, but more dispersed for developing economies than for high income 
economies.  The average percentage decline in banking sector stocks was higher for high income 
countries. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics on measures of financial stress during the crisis.  
Developing countries on average saw larger net capital outflows during the crisis than high income 
countries. Developing countries on average also saw larger net capital outflows in 2009Q1 than in 
2008Q4, even though net portfolio inflows had turned positive during the first quarter of 2009.  This, 
coupled with a relative stability of their FDI flows (mean of -0.001 and standard deviation of 1.2 in 
2008Q4,  and mean of -0.6 and standard deviation of 1.4 in 2009Q1), suggests an important role for other 
investment, including trade credit and bank lending, and financial derivatives in the reversal of capital 
inflows to developing countries during the crisis.  In fact, 29 out of the 35 developing economics which 
saw net capital outflows during 2008Q4 also saw net capital outflows exceeding their net portfolio 
                                                 
4 However, Hong Kong and Singapore are also offshore financial centers so excluded from the analysis.  outflows during this quarter (another two countries saw net capital inflows that were lower than their net 
portfolio inflows).
5 In 2009Q1, this pattern held for 32 out of 33 developing countries which saw net 
capital outflows during this quarter. High income countries, on the other hand, saw greater movements in 
their net portfolio inflows than in net capital inflows. The high income countries continued to be net 
capital inflow recipients on average during 2008Q4, as well as net portfolio inflow recipients during both 
quarters. High income countries also exhibited considerably higher dispersion in their level of net 
portfolio inflows than in their net capital inflows. 17 out of 25 high income countries saw net capital 
inflows during 2008Q4, but only 10 of these saw net portfolio inflows. These figures suggest that other 
investment, including bank lending flowed from developing to high income countries, because of 
deleveraging pressures or to buffer the capital bases of their holding companies. They also suggest that 
net capital inflows to developing countries recovered later than portfolio flows.  
While high income countries on average saw higher net capital inflows and net portfolio inflows 
during the crisis quarters, compared to net outflows for developing economies, the percentage decline in 
bank equity prices and stock indices was comparable between the two groups of countries. High income 
countries saw their central banks respond more on average, by increasing the size of their balance sheets 
relative to the country’s GDP.  
II.3. Was there decoupling before Lehman Brothers’ demise? 
Stock prices had started declining in all over the world before net capital inflow reversals 
peaked.  
Most emerging as well as high income countries saw their stock markets and the banking sector 
stock prices peak before Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, in 2008Q3. Figure 
1 shows for each quarter since 2005Q1, the number of countries in each income group, that had their 
stock markets and bank equity indices peak in that quarter. Most banking sector peaks for high income 
countries occur in 2007Q2, and all but one high income countries had seen their banking equity index 
peaks by the end of 2007Q4. Their overall stock market indices peaked later but 86.7 percent of the stock 
markets in high income countries had peaked by the end of 2007Q4. All of the high income countries had 
seen their stock markets and bank equity sector indices peak before the end of 2008Q2.  
The picture for developing countries is, surprisingly, not much different. 75 percent of developing 
economy banking sector equity price indices had peaked by the end of 2007Q4, and 59.4 percent of their 
                                                 
5 There are 56 developing economies for which data on both net capital inflows and net portfolio inflows is 
available for 2008Q4 and 40 for which this data is available for 2009Q1. stock indices had also peaked before 1 Jan 2008. Moreover, all of the developing country banking sector 
equity indices had peaked before the end of 2008Q2, and only one developing economy, Tunisia, did not 
see the beginning of a stock market decline before the end of 2008Q2, i.e. before 30 June, 2008. In 
contrast, most developing economies saw their net capital inflow reversals peak in 2008Q4, after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy.
6 
Not only was the timing of emergence of internal financial stress in developing economies 
comparable to that of emergence of internal stress in high income countries, but the size of the declines in 
the price indices was also comparable. Figures 2 and 3 depict the percentage of total peak-trough decline 
in bank sector and benchmark stock market indices that had already taken place by the end of 2008Q2, or 
roughly two months and a half before Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. The median decline in banking sector 
stocks (as percentage of total peak-trough decline for that country) is 51.1 percent, about the level for 
USA. The median decline is close for the two groups of countries (the median for high income countries 
is 48.4 and for low income countries 53), as is evident from the relatively equal distribution of blue and 
red dots around the median line in both the graphs. The declines in the banking sector and overall stock 
indices in the two groups of countries are comparable even when measured as percentage of peak value 
(instead of as percentage of total peak to trough decline). For high income countries, the median 
percentage decline from peak in stock market index by the end of 2008Q2 was 27.5 percent, compared to 
25.4 percent for developing economies. The median decline from peak in banking sector stocks in high 
income countries by the end of 2008Q2 was 36.4 percent, compared to 32.3 percent in developing 
economies. This pattern is consistent with the possibility that problems in the banking sectors had 
emerged even in developing countries before the emergence of significant external financial stress, or that 
the market was pricing the risk of future contagion, i.e. that it did not quite believe in decoupling.  
To provide further insight on the issue, it is useful to look at the correlations between the 
indicators of external financial stress and the peak to trough declines in banking and overall stock prices. 
The correlations between the measures of external financial stress and peak to trough measures of internal 
financial stress are presented in Table 3. The peak to trough change in banking sector equity indices is not 
significantly correlated with any external stress indicator. However, the overall significance masks 
important differences between high income, which were net recipient of capital inflows during the crisis 
and developing countries, which on average saw net capital outflows during the crisis. Figure 4 plots the 
net capital inflow reversals and net portfolio inflow reversals during 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 against the 
peak trough change in banking sector indices and figure 5 does the same against peak to trough change in 
                                                 
6 The median developing country saw positive net capital inflows (relative to 2007 average) in 2008Q2 and 
2008Q3.  stock market indices. The slopes of the simple regression lines are different for high income and for 
developing economies. For high income countries, the correlations between capital inflow reversals and 
peak to trough declines in banking or benchmark stock price indices change signs, and only one out of the 
eight correlations is significantly different from zero.
7 However, for the emerging economies, the 
correlation between peak to trough equity price declines in bank or general stock market indices and net 
capital inflows is negative and significant in three out of the four cases (Table 4).
8 The correlation 
between peak to trough equity price declines in bank or general stock market declines and net portfolio 
inflows in 2009Q1 are both large in absolute value and significant. The fact that only the correlations in 
2009Q1 are significant but not those in 2008Q4 leaves open the possibility of reverse causality – that 
countries that faced larger net portfolio  outflows in 2009Q1 were the ones were the banking sector 
problems were more acute or where the impact of financial shocks on the overall economy was larger.  
In table 5, we present correlations of net capital inflow reversals or net portfolio inflow reversals with 
quarterly percentage changes in banking sector stock indices and overall stock indices for developing 
economies only. The quarterly change in stock index or banking sector index is not significantly 
correlated with net portfolio inflows in any quarter of 2008 or during 2009Q1. The percentage changes in 
banking sector stocks and in stock market indices are significantly correlated with net capital inflows in 
both the crisis quarters, i.e. countries with higher net capital inflows during crisis quarters saw smaller 
declines in stock prices in these quarters. However, the size of the correlations coefficients is not very 
high – less than 0.48. As we discussed above, stock markets in most countries had achieved considerable 
decline by 2008Q3, but the correlations between these declines and net capital inflows are not significant 
until 2008Q4. These results suggest that each country’s banking sector stress was not entirely determined 
by contagion. They are consistent with the possibility that the same factors were driving the two 
measures. 
III. Determinants of Internal and External Financial Stress 
 
We next turn to a formal investigation of the determinants of internal and external financial stress. 
Since the sample is not very large (33 to 70, depending on specification), and there are many potential 
explanatory measures of the attributes of interest, we ran sequential regressions. Each regression includes 
11 explanatory variables. Six of the 11 explanatory variables are common to all regressions, and are 
                                                 
7 The correlation between the change in net capital inflows in 2009Q1 and the peak to trough decline in stock 
index is -0.37and has a p-value of 0.08. Note that the correlations or p-values are not shown in the figures but 
available on request. Unless otherwise noted, significance is evaluated at 10 percent level.  
8 Note that this table gives the negative of the values on the x-axis in the corresponding figures.   commonly accepted measures of the underlying fundamental that we are trying to capture. These common 
explanatory variables are: 
1.  per capita real GDP in 2007, 
2.  international reserves-to-GDP ratio in 2007,  
3.  an interaction term between international reserves-GDP ratio and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the country was a recipient of a swap line by the Federal Reserve, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) or the People’s Bank of China (PBC),  
4.  Trade-GDP ratio in 2007, 
5.   a dummy variable for whether the country was a commodity exporter, and  
6.  de-jure restrictions on capital flows measured by the Chinn-Ito index.  
 
In addition to these six, each regression includes one indicator each of a country’s de-facto external 
exposure, the quality of its institutions, financial development, and banking sector competitiveness or 
health, as well as an interaction term between the indicator of institutional quality and banking sector 
competitiveness or health. The indicators used for each category of variables, are: 
7.  De-facto external exposure:  
a.  balance sheet exposure, defined as (total external debt-reserves) /GDP,  
b.  short term balance sheet exposure, defined as short term debt-reserves/GDP,  
c.  aggregate foreign exchange exposure from Lane and Shambaugh (higher values means 
the country is long on foreign currency assets),  
d.  external portfolio debt assets/GDP from Lane and Milesi Ferreti, and 
e.  portfolio debt liabilities/GDP from Lane and Milesi Ferreti.    
8.  Institutions:  
a.  regulatory quality and  
b.  banking supervision 
9.  Financial Development:  
a.  private credit by domestic banks/GDP,  
b.  stock market value traded/GDP 
10. Banking sector competition/health:  
a.  Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI),  
b.  concentration ratio,  
c.  net interest margins,  
d.  bank non-performing loans rate,  e.  bank liquid reserves/assets, and 
f.  bank capital to asset ratio.  
11. An interaction term between the indicator of institutions and banking sector competition/health. 
 
We summarize the results of the regressions in tables 6 and 7. The second column of each table lists 
the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in that row was included, the ‘% Sig.’ 
column lists the percentage of these regressions in which that explanatory variable was significant at 10 
percent level of significance. The cells in this column are shaded dark to light, depending on the number 
contained. The darkest shadings indicate that the estimated coefficient of the relevant variable is 
significant (at 10 percent level) in all regressions in which it is included, medium shading that it is 
significant in 95 percent of the regressions or more but not in all, and a light shading that it is significant 
in at least 90 percent but less than 95 percent of the regressions in which it is included.  The ‘Sign’ 
column lists the sign of the estimated coefficient. For variables for which the sign of the coefficient 
changed with specification, this column lists +/-. The table tells us the sign of the coefficients associated 
with each explanatory variable and gives us information on the robustness of the impact of this variable.   
 
III.1. Determinants of External Financial Stress 
The results for the determinants of external stress are summarized in table 6. The results indicate that 
only five of the 33 explanatory variables considered can be robustly associated with deeper external 
financial stress in either of the crisis quarters. This finding is an improvement over the results of Rose and 
Spiegel (2010a, b.), who find that only stock market appreciation pre-crisis and closer trade linkages with 
the US could be linked to the severity of the crisis. Of the variables that are robustly linked to greater 
capital outflows and greater portfolio outflows in table 6, four are measures of de-facto openness. 
Countries with greater external portfolio debt assets or liabilities as percentage of GDP in 2007 saw 
smaller net capital inflows (relative to 2007 levels and expressed as percentage of 2007 GDP) and smaller 
net portfolio inflows (also relative to 2007 levels and expressed as percentage of 2007 GDP) during each 
of the crisis quarters. Countries with greater balance sheet exposure, defined as the excess of total external 
debt over reserves, as percentage of GDP in 2007 were also mose prone to portfolio outflows during the 
first crisis quarter (2008Q4) and to net capital outflows during 2009Q1. Although this variables is not 
always significant in the other regressions explaining external stress (net capital inflow reversals in 
2008Q4 and net portfolio inflow reversals in 2009Q1), its coefficient is always negative in sign.  An important result here is the sign and significance of the pre-crisis level of international reserves. 
Countries with greater international reserves as percentage of GDP in 2007 saw greater net capital 
outflows and greater net portfolio outflows in the second crisis quarter. To check whether these results are 
dominated by high income countries which have lower reserves to GDP ratios, we re-ran the regressions 
for the developing country sample only. For this sample, the reserves/GDP ratio is still negatively related 
to net capital inflows in all regressions, but significantly different from zero only in 81 percent and 68 
percent of regressions for 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 respectively. The coefficient on reserves/GDP changes 
sign in regressions explaining net portfolio reversals in developing countries. But whenever it is 
significant (in 42 percent of regressions for 2008Q4 and in 64 percent of the regressions for 2009Q1), it is 
negative. However, the number of observations in these regressions is very low – between 18 and 49. In 
figures 6 and 7, we graph the net capital inflows during each quarter in 2008 against the reserves GDP 
ratio in 2007. The red line in these figures gives the unconditional correlation between the net capital or 
portfolio inflows and reserves/GDP for developing countries, as opposed to the conditional correlations 
estimated for the both developing and high income countries through the regressions. Nevertheless, these 
are instructive, not only because of what these correlations are, but because of what they are not. The 
correlation between net capital inflow reversals and the 2007 reserves GDP ratio is mildly positive during 
2008Q1 to 2008Q3, but negative during 2008Q4. During the first quarter of global financial distress, 
having higher reserves stockpiles did not reduce the capital outflows for developing countries. Figure 7 
shows that the correlation between net portfolio inflows and initial reserves/GDP was negative in the last 
three quarters of 2008. One possible explanation of the negative correlation between reserves/GDP and 
external stress during the crisis is related to moral hazard associated with rapid reserve accumulation – 
larger reserves stockpiles may have encouraged build-up of risks by subsidizing cross-border borrowing 
and discouraging hedging of exposures. 
Further, none of the variables measuring institutions or financial development or banking sector 
competition or health are consistently of the same sign and robustly correlated with the measures of 
external stress. The only exception is the interaction term between regulatory quality and banking sector 
liquid reserves to assets, which is significant in 9 out of the 10 regressions in which it is included. 
However, it is associated with significantly lower net capital inflows during the crisis.  
The lack of robust negative association between measures of banking sector health and external 
financial stress does not necessarily imply that banking sector health was not important in determining the 
degree of external stress. It may imply that there were important differences between high income and 
other countries or that our proxies do not adequately capture the health of the banking sector, or the 
fundamentals that were important in determining susceptibility during this crisis. With the latter interpretation, the lack of results here does provide a cautionary note on the adequacy of these measures 
as part of an early warning system.  
III.2. Determinants of Internal Financial Stress 
The results on the determinants of internal financial stress are presented in table 7. The measures of 
stock market price changes in table 7 are defined as peak to trough declines, so that a negative coefficient 
value of an explanatory variable would imply lower fall in these, i.e. lower internal stress.  There is no 
single indicator that is robustly significantly associated with all three measures of internal stress, although 
at least one measure of de-facto openness is associated with all three measures of internal stress.  
While the institutional variables by themselves are not consistently of the same sign or significance in 
the regressions for the peak to trough decline in banking sector stock prices, several interaction terms with 
these variables are significant. Countries with better banking supervision and higher bank capital to assets 
ratio saw smaller declines in banking sector stock prices. Countries with more concentrated banking 
sectors also had more stable banking sectors in this crisis. However, the same was true for more 
competitive but better supervised banking sectors. Countries with greater balance sheet exposure, 
measured by external debt less reserves saw greater declines in banking sector equity prices, while 
commodity exporters saw lower stress.  
Commodity exporters and countries with more developed financial sectors (measured by private 
credit by domestic banks as percentage of GDP) saw smaller declines in their overall stock markets. 
Countries with greater de-facto openness measured by portfolio debt assets or liabilities as percentage of 
GDP saw greater stock market declines. Central banks also seem to have responded more in countries 
with greater de-facto openness. The coefficients of total external debt minus reserves, external portfolio 
assets/GDP and external portfolio liabilities/GDP are all positive and significant in every specification. 
No other variable is consistently significant and of the same sign in alternative specifications explaining 
the expansion in central bank’s assets.  
IV. Determinants of the Tentative Recovery 
Our measures of recovery are defined analogously to the measures of stress. We consider the net 
capital inflows and net portfolio inflows (in excess of the average levels in 2007 and expressed as 
percentage of 2007 GDP) in each of the quarters 2009Q2, 2009Q3 and 2009Q4. In addition, we consider 
the trough to peak percentage increase in bank equity price indices and stock price indices, in the period 
from the trough date to 7 July 2010.  The regressions results for determinants of net capital inflows are summarized in table 8 and for net 
portfolio inflows in Table 9. The set of variables explaining the external stress during the recovery phase 
overlaps to a large extent with the set of variables explaining distress during the crisis quarters. The 
pattern of net capital inflows during 2009Q2 and 2009Q3 is hard to explain – countries with better 
banking supervision and greater banking sector liquid reserves to assets ratio saw smaller net capital 
inflows in 2009Q2 and countries with greater external portfolio debt assets saw lower net capital inflows 
in 2009Q3. But in 2009Q4, the pattern becomes more identifiable. Countries with greater initial values of 
balance sheet exposure (external debt less reserves) saw lower net capital inflows during 2009Q4, as did 
those with greater initial values of portfolio debt assets as percentage of GDP. This suggests that countries 
with greater external vulnerabilities before the crisis saw greater external financial stress during the crisis 
as well as slower recovery in net capital inflows.  
Once again, higher initial level of international reserves/GDP is associated with lower net capital 
inflows in 2009Q4. Higher reserves are also negatively correlated with net capital inflows during 2009Q2, 
although the coefficient is not always significant, and the coefficient of reserves/GDP changes sign in the 
regressions of net capital inflows in 2009Q2, but is negative whenever it is significant. The overall 
patterns can be seen in Figure 8. This result is significant because it calls into question the ability of large 
reserve stockpiles to insulate the country from reversals of capital flows.  
As far as net portfolio inflows are concerned, larger external vulnerabilities, measured by greater 
(total external debt-reserves)/GDP and external portfolio debt assets or liabilities/GDP were associated 
with lower net portfolio inflows during 2009Q2 (as they were during the crisis quarters), but with higher 
net portfolio inflows in the subsequent two quarters. Countries with better regulatory quality or banking 
supervision and more competitive banking sector also saw greater net portfolio inflows during the last 
quarter of 2009.  
The recovery in internal stress measures seems to be unrelated to most macroeconomic variables, 
whether real sector (GDP per capita, trade/GDP, commodity exporter) or measuring institutional 
development or banking sector competitiveness, or regulation. However, the recovery in banking sector 
stock prices is positively related to the measures of de-facto external openness, including external 
portfolio debt assets of liabilities as percentage of GDP. The banking sector recovery is also positively 
linked with balance sheet exposure (total external debt less reserves/GDP). Figure 9 graphs the 
relationships between peak to trough decline in banking sector index and post-crisis trough to peak rise in 
the index, against the initial balance sheet exposures. The top panel plots the entire sample, whereas the bottom panel excludes the outlier, Ireland. Both panels show a positive relationship, although, it seems to 
be driven by the relationship in high income countries.  
The only two variables that are robustly associated with the trough to peak percentage rise in stock 
index are the aggregate foreign exchange exposure and the private credit by domestic banks as percentage 
of GDP. The sign of both these variables is negative – i.e. countries that were long in foreign exchange or 
had better developed banking sectors, saw smaller post-crisis recovery in stock indices. 
The results suggest that the internal and external distress was closely interlinked with common 
underlying causes of both the severity of stress during the crisis and the recovery. External vulnerabilities 
played a role in determining the severity of external and internal financial stress during the crisis phase, as 
well as the recovery phase.  
V.  Conclusions  
The global crisis of 2008-9 painfully illustrated that, beyond idiosyncratic deviations, practically 
all countries were exposed to a fast moving, common global shock propagated from the US.  Our analysis 
showed that the timing of emergence of internal financial stress in developing economies was in tandem 
with the emergence of the stress in high income countries.  In addition, the size of the peak-trough 
declines in the stock price indices, about 60 percent, was comparable to that in high income countries.  
The main difference seems to be in the greater dispersion of the decline in low and middle countries, with 
a standard deviation that was twice that of the high income countries.  As far as stock markets goes, there 
was no decupling between developing and high income countries.
9  
We found clear evidence that deleveraging of developed country positions dominated the patterns 
of capital flows during the crisis.  While high income countries on average saw net capital inflows and net 
portfolio inflows during the crisis quarters, compared to net outflows for developing economies, the 
indicators of banking sector stress were higher for high income economies on average than for developing 
economies. The evidence is consistent with the notion that banking systems in the high income countries 
were, on average, more exposed to pressure, and that the central banks in high income countries 
responded more aggressively to that pressure.  High income countries saw larger average peak to trough 
declines in bank equity prices than developing countries, and saw their central banks respond more by 
increasing the size of their balance sheets relative to the country’s GDP.   
                                                 
9 Intriguingly, this is exactly the outcome one may expect with deep diversification of financial 
markets. In line with the effects of greater integration of markets, we found that de-facto openness was 
associated with greater capital outflows and greater portfolio outflows. Specifically, countries with greater 
external portfolio debt assets or liabilities as percentage of GDP in 2007 saw greater net capital inflow 
reversals and greater net portfolio reversals during each of the crisis quarters. Countries with greater 
balance sheet exposure, defined as the excess of total external debt over reserves as percentage of GDP in 
2007, were also most prone to portfolio outflows during the first crisis quarter (2008Q4) and to net capital 
outflows during 2009Q1.  Banking sector stock price declines were lower in countries with better banking 
supervision and higher bank capital to assets ratio. Banking sectors were also more stable in countries 
with more concentrated banking sectors. Intriguingly, the same was true for more competitive but better 
supervised banking sectors. Countries with greater external debt less reserves saw greater declines in 
banking sector stocks.   
The results suggest that, while openness increases exposure to global shocks, deeper capital 
markets and lower balance sheet exposures tend to increase the resilience of markets.  Specifically, 
commodity exporters and countries with more developed financial sectors saw smaller declines in their 
overall stock markets. Countries with greater de-facto openness measured by portfolio debt assets or 
liabilities as percentage of GDP saw greater stock market declines. Central banks also seem to have 
responded more in countries with greater de-facto openness.  Small total external debt minus reserves, 
external portfolio assets/GDP and external portfolio liabilities/GDP are all associated with lower internal 
financial stress. 
We close the paper with analysis of the onset of the tentative recovery following the peak of the 
crisis. Evidence suggests that countries with greater external vulnerabilities before the crisis saw greater 
external financial stress during the crisis as well as slower recovery in net capital inflows. Countries with 
better regulatory quality and more competitive banking sector saw greater net portfolio inflows during the 
last quarter of 2009.  The recovery in banking sector stock prices is positively related to the measures of 
de-facto external openness, including external portfolio debt assets of liabilities as percentage of GDP. 
These results suggest that the internal and external distress was closely interlinked with common 
underlying causes of both the severity of stress during the crisis and the recovery. External vulnerabilities 
played a role in determining the severity of external and internal financial stress during the crisis phase, as 
well as the recovery phase.   
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2007Q1  0 0  0  0 
2007Q2  0 0  0  0 
2007Q3  0 0  0  0 
2007Q4  0 0  0  0 
2008Q1  12 8 14  0  0 
2008Q2  8 11 6 0  0 
2008Q3  13 11 14 0 0 
2008Q4  21 29 43  15  22 
2009Q1  10 2 18  34  36 
2009Q2  8 6 6  1  2 
2009Q3  7 5 2  0  0 
2009Q4  6 8 3  0  2 
2010Q1  0 0 1  0  0 
2010Q2  0 0 0  0  0 
2010Q3  0 0 0  0  0 
2008Q4 or 
2009Q1 
31 31 61  49  58 
Total 85 80  107  50  62 
Note: D. Net Capital Inflows = (Net capital inflows for that quarter – Average quarterly net capital 
inflow in 2007)*100/GDP in 2007.  D. Net Portfolio Inflows = (Net portfolio inflows for that quarter – 
Average quarterly net portfolio inflow in 2007)*100/GDP in 2007.  Table 2: Summary Statistics, Financial Stress Indicators 
Low and Middle Income    High Income 
N  Median Mean Std. Dev   N  Median  Mean Std. Dev 
D.Net K Inflows/GDP 
(2008Q4 - 2007 mean) 
 
59 -0.51 -0.84  3.93   25 0.28  0.17  2.41 
D.Net K Inflows/GDP 
(2009Q1 - 2007 mean) 
 
43 -1.42 -2.19  3.11   24 -0.32 -0.15  1.93 
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP 
(2008Q4 - 2007 mean) 
 
54 -0.37 -0.52  1.42   25 0.42  0.36  6.35 
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP 
(2009Q1 - 2007 mean) 
 
40 -0.03 -0.08  1.21   24 0.96  1.40  3.11 
Peak EMP  90 0.15  0.20  0.18    17 0.19  0.25  0.19 
Peak to Trough Fall in Bank 
Equity Index (as % of Peak Value) 
 
24 59.2 61.8 16.0   26 78.3 75.3  14.4 
Peak to Trough Fall in Stock 
Index (as % of Peak Value) 
 
32 60.3 58.3 17.3   30 64.3 63.8  8.9 
D. (Central Bank Assets/GDP) 
(2009-2007) 
56 1.79 1.19 6.62   23 0.56 4.55  10.6 
D.Net K Inflows/GDP (2008Q4 - 2007 mean) = (Net Capital Inflows in 2008Q4 – Average Quarterly Net Capital 
Inflow in 2007)*100/GDP in 2007. D.Net K Inflows/GDP (2009Q1 - 2007 mean)  is defined similarly for 2009Q1. 
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP (2008Q4 - 2007 mean) = (Net Portfolio Inflows in 2008Q4 – Average Quarterly Net 
Portfolio Inflows in 2007)*100/GDP in 2007. Peak EMP is the peak exchange market pressure since January 2008 and 
January 2010. (Trough-Peak) Bank Equity Index (as % of Peak value) = (Trough-Peak)*100/Peak for peak and trough 
values of banking sector stock price index. (Trough-Peak) Stock Index (as % of Peak value) is similarly defined for the 
benchmark stock market index.  D. Central Bank Assets/GDP (2009-2007) is the change between 2009 and 2007 in the 
central bank’s assets to GDP ratio, expressed as a percentage. Std. Dev refers to the standard deviation. 
 
Table 3: Correlations between Measures of External and Internal Financial Stress: All Countries 
      12345   6   7 8
D.NetK  Inflows/GDP  1  1         
(2008Q4  -  2007  mean)            
            
D.NetK Inflows/GDP  2  0.57  1         
(2009Q1  -  2007  mean)    0.00         
            
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP  3  0.33  0.19  1       
(2008Q4 - 2007 mean)    0.00  0.14             
            
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP  4  0.37 0.33 0.56 1      
(2009Q1 - 2007 mean)    0.00  0.01  0.00           
            
Peak  EMP  5  -0.17  0.01 0.01 0.20 1       
    0.19 0.95 0.93 0.18        
            
Peak to Trough Fall in Bank  6  0.03  -0.20  0.14  0.17  0.02  1     
Equity Index (as % of Peak Value)    0.86  0.22  0.35  0.28  0.93       
            
Peak to Trough Fall in Stock  7  -0.24 -0.51 -0.05 -0.08 0.15  0.74  1  
Index (as % of Peak Value)    0.09  0.00  0.74  0.62  0.32  0.00     
            
D. Central Bank Assets/GDP  8  0.04  -0.11  -0.45  -0.09 0.07  0.30  0.23 1 
(2009-2007)    0.78 0.47 0.00 0.54 0.61 0.08 0.12  
Note: The second row for each variable gives the p-value for the null that the correlation coefficient is zero. The 
correlations in bold are those that are significantly different from zero at 10 percent level of significance.  
 
 
Table 4: Correlations between Measures of External and Internal Financial Stress: 
Developing Countries 
        1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8
D.NetK  Inflows/GDP  1 1           
(2008Q4 - 2007 mean)                   
              
D.NetK Inflows/GDP  2 0.53  1          
(2009Q1 - 2007 mean)    0.00               
              
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP  3 0.41  -0.05 1        
(2008Q4 - 2007 mean)    0.00  0.75             
              
D.Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP  4 0.31 0.30 0.43 1      
(2009Q1 - 2007 mean)    0.05  0.06  0.01           
              
Peak  EMP  5 -0.12 -0.04 0.10  0.25  1    
     0.41  0.80 0.49 0.14        
Peak to Trough Fall in Bank  6 -0.35 -0.70 0.09  -0.55 -0.03 1     
Equity Index (as % of Peak Value)   0.11  0.00  0.68  0.02  0.90       
Peak to Trough Fall in Stock  7 -0.46 -0.65 -0.12 -0.68 0.18  0.90  1  
Index (as % of Peak Value)     0.02  0.00   0.56   0.00  0.33  0.00     
D. Central Bank Assets/GDP  8 0.20  0.03 0.22 0.29 0.05 0.04  0.10 1
(2009-2007)   0.21 0.87 0.17 0.11 0.75 0.89  0.64  
Note: The second row for each variable gives the p-value for the null that the correlation coefficient is 
zero. The numbers in bold are correlations that are significantly different from zero at 10 percent level 
of significance. 
  
Table 5: Correlations of quarterly net capital inflows or net portfolio inflows (relative to 2007 
average) and quarterly changes in measure of internal financial stress for developing countries. 
D.Net Portfolio 
Inflows/GDP_2007  D.Net Capital Inflows/GDP_2007 
% Change in  
Bank Equity 
Index 
% Change in  
Stock Index 
% Change in  
Bank Equity 
Index 
% Change in  
Stock Index 
2008Q1  0.26 -0.09  0.48  -0.12 
0.23 0.66  0.02  0.55 
2008Q2  0.18 0.17  0.17  0.06 
0.43 0.38  0.45  0.78 
2008Q3  -0.02 0.13  -0.09  -0.01 
0.92 0.53  0.68  0.94 
2008Q4  -0.03 0.01  0.33 0.40 
0.35 0.97  0.14  0.04 
2009Q1  0.07 0.14  0.46 0.42 
0.77 0.54  0.05  0.06 
Note: The second row for each quarter gives the p-value for the null that the correlation coefficient is 
zero. The numbers in bold are correlations that are significantly different from zero at 10 percent level 
of significance.  Table 6: Determinants of External Financial Stress  
 
∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007   ∆Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP2007 
2008Q4 2009Q1 2008Q4 2009Q1 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
            
All regressions included these...            
GDP per capita (constant USD), 2007  120  73  +  13  +/-  3  +/-  0  +/- 
International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007  120  88  -  97  - 70  +/-  100  - 
(Reserves/GDP)* Swap Line   120  58  -  28  +  87  -  5  - 
Trade,  %  of  GDP,  2007  120  83 + 13  +/-  70 + 35 + 
Commodity  Exporter  120  2 +/- 3 +/- 6 +/- 0 +/- 
De-Jure  Openness  (Chinn-Ito  Index),  2007  120  7 +/- 1 +/- 0 +/- 3 +/- 
            
...and one indicator from each group:             
De-facto External Openness:            
(Total External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007   24 83  -  100  -  100  - 4 - 
(Short Term External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007  24  83  +/-  71  -  0  +/-  0  +/- 
Aggregate Forex Exposure, 2005   24  67 +  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
External Portfolio Debt Assets, % of GDP, 2007   24  100  -  100  -  100  - 88 - 
External Portfolio Debt Liabilities, % of GDP, 2007    24  100  -  100  -  100  -  100  - 
Institutions:            
Regulatory  Quality,  2007  60  28  +/- 2 +/- 2 +/- 2 +/- 
Banking Supervision, 2007  60  30  +/-  38  -  5  +/-  2  +/- 
Financial Development:            
Private Credit by Domestic Banks, % of  GDP,  2007  60  7 +/- 2 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Stock Market Value Traded, % of GDP, 2007  60  2  +/-  8  +/-  22  +  0  +/- 
(continued on next page…) 
 
 
 Table 6 (continued): Determinants of External Financial Stress  
 
∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007   ∆Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP2007 
2008Q4 2009Q1 2008Q4 2009Q1 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
Banking Sector Competition/Health:            
Herfindahl  Hirschman  Index  (HHI),  2007  20  0 +/- 5  +  0 +/- 0 +/- 
3-Bank Concentration ratio, 2007  20  20  +/-  45  +  35  -  0  +/- 
Net  Interest  Margins,  2007  20  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 0  - 
Bank Non-Performing Loans Rate, 2006  20  0  +/-  15  +/-  5  +/-  15  +/- 
Bank Liquid Reserves, % of Assets, 2006  20  75  +/-  5  +/-  5  +  0  +/- 
Bank Capital to Assets ratio, 2006  20  30  +/-  0  +/-  40  +  0  +/- 
Interactions:            
Regulatory  Quality*(-HHI)  10  0  +/-  30  + 0 - 0 - 
Banking Supervision *(-HHI)  10  0  +  10  +  0  +/-  0  +/- 
Regulatory  Quality*(-Concentration)  10  0 +/- 0  +  0 +/- 0 +/- 
Banking  Supervision*(-Concentration)  10  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 0  - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0  +/-  0  +/-  10  +/-  10  + 
Banking  Supervision*(-Net  Interest  Margin)  10  0 +/- 0  -  0 +/- 0  - 
Regulatory  Quality*(-Bank  NPL  Rate)  10  20 +/- 10 +/-  0  +/-  0  +/- 
Banking  Supervision*(-Bank  NPL  Rate)  10  0 +/-  30 - 10 -  0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  90  -  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Banking Supervision* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  40  -  0  +/-  0  -  0  +/- 
Regulatory Quality*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  80  +  0  +  0  -  0  - 
Banking Supervision*Bank Capital to Assets  Ratio  10  60  +/- 0 +/-  50 - 20 - 
Notes: ∆Net capital inflow and ∆net portfolio inflows are defined with respect to the average quarterly values during 2007. The dependent variable in the column 
labelled ∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007 (2008Q4), therefore, is the difference between net capital inflows in 2008Q4 and the average quarterly net capital inflows in 
2007.   ‘No. of Reg.’ is the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in the relevant row was used. ‘% Sig’ is the number of regressions in which that 
explanatory variable was significant at 10% level, using robust standard errors. ‘Sign’ denotes the sign of the estimated coefficient. If the estimated coefficient 
changes signs in different regressions for the same dependent variable, the ‘Sign’ column lists +/-. All regressions excluded countries with population less than a 
million and offshore financial centers and tax havens. All interactions terms are defined such that larger values indicate better institutions and more 
competitive/developed banking sector (in the interaction term between Regulatory quality and HHI, for example, HHI is preceded by a negative sign). 
  
 
Table 7: Determinants of Internal Financial Stress  
 
Peak-Trough Fall in 
Bank Equity Index 
Peak-Trough Fall in 
Stock Index 
Increase in Central 
Bank Assets/GDP, 
2009-2007 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign 
          
All regressions included these...          
GDP per capita (constant USD), 2007  120  68 + 10  +/-  20  +/- 
International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007  120  8  +/- 67 +/-  3  +/- 
(Reserves/GDP)*Swap Line   120  11 +/- 23 +/- 11  - 
Trade, % of GDP, 2007  120  13 +/- 13 +/-  2  +/- 
Commodity Exporter  120  100  -  96  - 1  +/- 
De-Jure Openness (Chinn-Ito Index), 2007  120  2 +/- 1 +/-  34 - 
          
...and one indicator from each group:           
De-facto External Openness:          
(Total External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007   24  92  + 58 +  100  + 
(Short Term External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007  24  71  +  4  +/- 13 +/- 
Aggregate Forex Exposure, 2005   24  88 - 25  +/-  29  +/- 
External Portfolio Debt Assets, % of GDP, 2007   24  75 +  100  +  100  + 
External Portfolio Debt Liabilities, % of GDP, 2007    24  75 +  100  +  100  + 
Institutions:          
Regulatory Quality, 2007  60  65  +/- 0 +/- 3 +/- 
Banking Supervision, 2007  60  75 +/- 13 +/- 15 +/- 
Financial Development:          
Private Credit by Domestic Banks, % of GDP, 2007  60  30 +/- 90  - 12  +/- 
Stock Market Value Traded, % of GDP, 2007  60  3  +/- 33 +/- 60  - 
(continued on next page…) 
 Table 7 (continued): Determinants of Internal Financial Stress  
 
Peak-Trough Fall in 
Bank Equity Index 
Peak-Trough Fall in 
Stock Index 
Increase in Central 
Bank Assets/GDP, 
2009-2007 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
Banking Sector Competition/Health:          
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 2007  20  50 -  5 +/- 5 +/- 
3-Bank Concentration ratio, 2007  20  90  -  0 +/- 0 +/- 
Net Interest Margins, 2007  20  70 + 10  +/-  40  +/- 
Bank Non-Performing Loans Rate, 2006  20  0 +/- 0  - 50  +/- 
Bank Liquid Reserves, % of Assets, 2006  20  15 +/- 20 +/-  0  +/- 
Bank Capital to Assets ratio, 2006  20  80  + 0 +  90  +/- 
Interactions:          
Regulatory Quality*(-HHI)  10  20 - 80 -  0 +/- 
Banking Supervision *(-HHI)  10  90  - 0  +/-  30  - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Concentration)  10  80 - 20 - 10  +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Concentration)  10  100  -  0 +/- 0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  20 +  0 +/- 0  - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  0 +/- 0  + 10  +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  0 + 0  +/-  30  +/- 
Regulatory Quality* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  30 +  0 +/-  10 + 
Banking Supervision* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  0 +/- 0 +/- 0  - 
Regulatory Quality*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  80  - 0 - 0  +/- 
Banking Supervision*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  100  - 0 -  80  + 
Notes: ∆Net capital inflow and ∆net portfolio inflows are defined with respect to the average quarterly values during 2007. The dependent variable in the column 
labelled ∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007 (2008Q4), therefore, is the difference between net capital inflows in 2008Q4 and the average quarterly net capital inflows in 
2007.  ‘No. of Reg.’ is the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in the relevant row was used. ‘% Sig’ is the number of regressions in which that 
explanatory variable was significant at 10% level, using robust standard errors. ‘Sign’ denotes the sign of the estimated coefficient. If the estimated coefficient 
changes signs in different regressions for the same dependent variable, the ‘Sign’ column lists +/-. All regressions excluded countries with population less than a 
million and offshore financial centers and tax havens. All interactions terms are defined such that larger values indicate better institutions and more 
competitive/developed banking sector (in the interaction term between Regulatory quality and HHI, for example, HHI is preceded by a negative sign). 
  











Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign 
          
All regressions included these...          
GDP per capita (constant USD), 2007  120  20  +  0  +/- 11 +/- 
International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007  120  60 - 73  +/-  91  - 
(Reserves/GDP)*Swap Line   120  0 +/-  25 +  0 +/- 
Trade, % of GDP, 2007  120  0  +/- 15 +/-  0  +/- 
Commodity Exporter  120  2 +/-  36 +  0 +/- 
De-Jure Openness (Chinn-Ito Index), 2007  120  0 +/- 1 +/- 8 +/- 
          
...and one indicator from each group:           
De-facto External Openness:          
(Total External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007   24  0 +/-  83 - 100  - 
(Short Term External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007  24  0 +/-  13 - 50 - 
Aggregate Forex Exposure, 2005   24  46  + 4 + 4 + 
External Portfolio Debt Assets, % of GDP, 2007   24  21 + 92  -  100  - 
External Portfolio Debt Liabilities, % of GDP, 2007    24  17 + 63 - 83 - 
Institutions:          
Regulatory Quality, 2007  60  3  +/- 13 +/-  7  +/- 
Banking Supervision, 2007  60  28  +/- 7 +/-  57  +/- 
Financial Development:          
Private Credit by Domestic Banks, % of GDP, 2007  60  3 +/-  20 +  2 +/- 
Stock Market Value Traded, % of GDP, 2007  60  0 +/- 5 +/-  25 + 
(continued on next page…) 
 











Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
Banking Sector Competition/Health:          
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 2007  20  0 +/-  25 +  0 +/- 
3-Bank Concentration ratio, 2007  20  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Net Interest Margins, 2007  20  0 + 0  +/-  0  +/- 
Bank Non-Performing Loans Rate, 2006  20  10 +/- 20 +/- 15 +/- 
Bank Liquid Reserves, % of Assets, 2006  20  50  +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Bank Capital to Assets ratio, 2006  20  20  +/- 0 +/-  30  +/- 
Interactions:          
Regulatory Quality*(-HHI)  10  0  + 80 +  0 +/- 
Banking Supervision *(-HHI)  10  0 -  40  + 0 + 
Regulatory Quality*(-Concentration)  10  10 + 50 +  0 +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Concentration)  10  0 +/- 0  +  0  - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0  + 10 +  0 +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0 + 0  +/-  20 - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  0 +/-  70 - 40  +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  20 - 60 - 50 - 
Regulatory Quality* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  50  - 0 - 0 - 
Banking Supervision* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  100  -  0 +/- 0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  0 +/- 0  -  0  + 
Banking Supervision*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Notes: ∆Net capital inflow and ∆net portfolio inflows are defined with respect to the average quarterly values during 2007. The dependent variable in the column 
labelled ∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007 (2008Q4), therefore, is the difference between net capital inflows in 2008Q4 and the average quarterly net capital inflows in 
2007.  ‘No. of Reg.’ is the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in the relevant row was used. ‘% Sig’ is the number of regressions in which that 
explanatory variable was significant at 10% level, using robust standard errors. ‘Sign’ denotes the sign of the estimated coefficient. If the estimated coefficient 
changes signs in different regressions for the same dependent variable, the ‘Sign’ column lists +/-. All regressions excluded countries with population less than a 
million and offshore financial centers and tax havens. All interactions terms are defined such that larger values indicate better institutions and more 
competitive/developed banking sector (in the interaction term between Regulatory quality and HHI, for example, HHI is preceded by a negative sign). 
  











Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign 
          
All regressions included these...          
GDP per capita (constant USD), 2007  120  5 +/- 3 +/- 3 +/- 
International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007  120  25  +/- 4 +/- 2 +/- 
(Reserves/GDP)*Swap Line  120  0 +/-  76 +  0 +/- 
Trade, % of GDP, 2007  120  5 +/-  71 +  2 +/- 
Commodity Exporter  120  1 +/-  48 +  3 +/- 
De-Jure Openness (Chinn-Ito Index), 2007  120  28 -  1 +/- 0 +/- 
          
...and one indicator from each group:           
De-facto External Openness:          
(Total External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007   24  100  -  100  +  96  + 
(Short Term External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007  24  8  - 17 + 17 + 
Aggregate Forex Exposure, 2005   24  8 + 0  +/-  0  +/- 
External Portfolio Debt Assets, % of GDP, 2007   24  100  -  100 + 100  + 
External Portfolio Debt Liabilities, % of GDP, 2007    24  100  -  100 + 100  + 
Institutions:            
Regulatory Quality, 2007  60  12  +/- 0 +/- 8 +/- 
Banking Supervision, 2007  60  37  +/- 3 +/- 3 +/- 
Financial Development:          
Private Credit by Domestic Banks, % of GDP, 2007  60  0 +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Stock Market Value Traded, % of GDP, 2007  60  2 +/- 3 +/-  10  +/- 
(continued on next page…) 
 











Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
Banking Sector Competition/Health:          
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 2007  20  55 -  5 +/-  10  +/- 
3-Bank Concentration ratio, 2007  20  0 - 0  +/-  0 + 
Net Interest Margins, 2007  20  25  +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Bank Non-Performing Loans Rate, 2006  20  0  +/- 20 +/-  0  +/- 
Bank Liquid Reserves, % of Assets, 2006  20  20  +/- 0 +/- 0 +/- 
Bank Capital to Assets ratio, 2006  20  5 +/- 0 +/-  10  +/- 
Interactions:          
Regulatory Quality*(-HHI)  10  0 - 0  +/-  0  +/- 
Banking Supervision *(-HHI)  10  50  - 0 -  90  + 
Regulatory Quality*(-Concentration)  10  0 +/- 0  +  0  + 
Banking Supervision*(-Concentration)  10  0 - 0 + 0 + 
Regulatory Quality*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0 +/-  70 +  100  + 
Banking Supervision*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  70 +  0 +/- 0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  10 - 20  +/- 0 +/- 
Banking Supervision*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  0 +/-  30 -  0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  0 +/- 0  +  0  + 
Banking Supervision* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  80 -  0 +/- 0  - 
Regulatory Quality*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  40  - 0 - 0 - 
Banking Supervision*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  80 -  0 +/-  20 - 
Notes: ∆Net capital inflow and ∆net portfolio inflows are defined with respect to the average quarterly values during 2007. The dependent variable in the column 
labelled ∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007 (2008Q4), therefore, is the difference between net capital inflows in 2008Q4 and the average quarterly net capital inflows in 
2007.  ‘No. of Reg.’ is the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in the relevant row was used. ‘% Sig’ is the number of regressions in which that 
explanatory variable was significant at 10% level, using robust standard errors. ‘Sign’ denotes the sign of the estimated coefficient. If the estimated coefficient 
changes signs in different regressions for the same dependent variable, the ‘Sign’ column lists +/-. All regressions excluded countries with population less than a 
million and offshore financial centers and tax havens. All interactions terms are defined such that larger values indicate better institutions and more 
competitive/developed banking sector (in the interaction term between Regulatory quality and HHI, for example, HHI is preceded by a negative sign). 
  
 
Table 10: Determinants of internal financial recovery 
 
Recovery in Bank Equity Index 
(Trough-Peak % rise, post-crisis) 
Recovery in Stock Index (Trough-
Peak % rise, post-crisis) 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  %  Sig. Sign %  Sig. Sign 
        
All regressions included these...        
GDP per capita (constant USD), 2007  120  7 +/-  13  +/- 
International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007  120  38 +/-  8  +/- 
(Reserves/GDP)*Swap Line  120  0 +/- 1 +/- 
Trade, % of GDP, 2007  120  3 +/-  33  +/- 
Commodity Exporter  120  0 +/- 3 +/- 
De-Jure Openness (Chinn-Ito Index), 2007  120  1 +/- 0 +/- 
        
...and one indicator from each group:         
De-facto External Openness:        
(Total External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 2007   24  100  + 46  +/- 
(Short Term External Debt-Reserves), % of GDP, 
2007  24  33 +  8 +/- 
Aggregate Forex Exposure, 2005   24  46 -  100  - 
External Portfolio Debt Assets, % of GDP, 2007   24  100  + 42  +/- 
External Portfolio Debt Liabilities, % of GDP, 2007    24  100  + 50  +/- 
Institutions:        
Regulatory Quality, 2007  60  5 +/-  38  +/- 
Banking Supervision, 2007  60  0 +/- 8 +/- 
Financial Development:        
Private Credit by Domestic Banks, % of GDP, 2007  60  55 +/- 98  - 
Stock Market Value Traded, % of GDP, 2007  60  45 - 67  +/- 
(continued on next page…) 
 Table 11 (continued): Determinants of internal financial recovery 
 
Recovery in Bank Equity Index 
(Trough-Peak % rise, post-crisis) 
Recovery in Stock Index (Trough-
Peak % rise, post-crisis) 
Explanatory Variables  # of 
Reg.  % Sig.  Sign  % Sig.  Sign 
Banking Sector Competition/Health:         
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), 2007  20  10 +/-  50  - 
3-Bank Concentration ratio, 2007  20  15 +/-  65  - 
Net Interest Margins, 2007  20  0 +/-  15  +/- 
Bank Non-Performing Loans Rate, 2006  20  0 +/-  10  +/- 
Bank Liquid Reserves, % of Assets, 2006  20  5 +/-  50  +/- 
Bank Capital to Assets ratio, 2006  20  5 +/-  10 + 
Interactions:         
Regulatory Quality*(-HHI)  10  0 +/-  80 - 
Banking Supervision *(-HHI)  10  30 +/-  50  - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Concentration)  10  20 +/-  80  - 
Banking Supervision*(-Concentration)  10  0 +/-  50 - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  30 +/-  40  - 
Banking Supervision*(-Net Interest Margin)  10  0 +/-  20 - 
Regulatory Quality*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  10 +  50 + 
Banking Supervision*(-Bank NPL Rate)  10  0 +/-  0 +/- 
Regulatory Quality* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  20 +/-  0  +/- 
Banking Supervision* Bank Liquid Reserves/Assets  10  20 +  0  + 
Regulatory Quality*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  0 +/-  20 - 
Banking Supervision*Bank Capital to Assets Ratio  10  0 -  0  +/- 
Notes: ∆Net capital inflow and ∆net portfolio inflows are defined with respect to the average quarterly values during 2007. The dependent variable in the column 
labelled ∆Net Capital Inflows/GDP2007 (2008Q4), therefore, is the difference between net capital inflows in 2008Q4 and the average quarterly net capital inflows in 
2007.   ‘No. of Reg.’ is the number of regressions in which the explanatory variable in the relevant row was used. ‘% Sig’ is the number of regressions in which that 
explanatory variable was significant at 10% level, using robust standard errors. ‘Sign’ denotes the sign of the estimated coefficient. If the estimated coefficient 
changes signs in different regressions for the same dependent variable, the ‘Sign’ column lists +/-. All regressions excluded countries with population less than a 
million and offshore financial centers and tax havens. All interactions terms are defined such that larger values indicate better institutions and more 
competitive/developed banking sector (in the interaction term between Regulatory quality and HHI, for example, HHI is preceded by a negative sign). 





















































2005q1 2006q1 2007q3 2008q1 Lehman 2005q1 2006q1 2007q3 2008q1 Lehman 2009q3 2010q3
Banking Stocks Peaks Stock Market Peaks
Net Capital Inflow Troughs
Low and Middle Income Countries
 
Note: Only countries for which data on at least one equity price index is available are included in computing frequencies for net capital 






































































































































































High Income Low and Middle Income
17 to 81% of total peak-trough decline in bank equity prices
had already occured by the end of 2008Q2
 
  
Figure 3: Decline in general stock market price index by end of 2008Q2, as percentage of 





































































































































































































High Income Low and Middle Income
*Except Tunisia, where stock market peaked on 12 September 2008
17 to 84% of total peak-trough decline in stock prices
had already occured by the end of 2008Q2*
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   Note: Balance Sheet Exposure is defined as (Total External Debt-Reserves)*100/GDP in 2007. Bottom panels exclude Ireland. 
Data Appendix 
Variable Name  Description  Source 
3-Bank Concentration 
Ratio, 2007 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks.  Beck et. al (2009) 
Aggregate Forex 
Exposure, 2005 
Aggregate foreign currency exposure, as at the end of 2005. It is the difference 
between foreign assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, 
expressed as a ratio to total foreign assets and liabilities.  
Lane and Shambaugh 
(2010) 
Bank Capital to Assets 
Ratio, 2006 
Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. 
Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, 
general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital 
includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common stock), which is a common 
feature in all countries' banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which 
includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be 
repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these 
comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets include all nonfinancial and 
financial assets. 
World Bank WDI 
Bank Liquid Reserves, 
% of Assets, 2006 
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of domestic currency 
holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other 
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other 
banking institutions. 
World Bank WDI 
Bank Non-Performing 
Loans Rate, 2006 
Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans are the value of nonperforming 
loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming 
loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions). 
World Bank WDI 
Banking Supervision, 
2007 
Prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector. Values range from 0 
to 3, with higher values indicating better supervision. 
Financial Supervision 
database, Abiad et. Al. 
2009 
Commodity Exporter  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a major commodity exporter. We 
follow Rose and Spiegel (2010) in defining 36 countries as commodity exporters. 
These include: 1. All past and present OPEC countries; 2. Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, Kazakhstan, Norway, New Zealand and Russia;  3. Any country listed in 
CIA world factbook as having more than 50 percent exports from commodities; 
4. Any country listed in Cashin et. al. (2003). 
Rose and Spiegel (2010 
a) D. Net Capital 
Inflows/GDP, 
(200`i'Q`j'-2007 mean) 
(Net Capital inflows in year 200`i', quarter`j' - average quarterly net capital 
inflows in 2007)*100/GDP in 2007.   
IMF IFS 
D. Net Portfolio 
Inflows/GDP, 
(200`i'Q`j'-2007 mean) 
(Net Portfolio inflows in year 200`i', quarter`j' - average quarterly net portfolio 




Chinn-Ito index of the degree of legal restrictions on capital flows for the year 
2007. It varies from  -1.811621 to 2.531836, with higher values denoting greater 
openness 
Chinn and Ito (2006), 
updated 
External Portfolio 
Debt Assets, % of 
GDP, 2007 




Debt Liabilities, % of 
GDP, 2007 
  updated data from Lane 
and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2007) 
GDP per capita 
(constant USD), 2007 
GDP per capita in 2007, expressed in constant (2000) US dollars.   World Bank WDI 
Increase in Central 
Bank's Assets, 2009-
2007 
Central bank's assets/GDP in 2009, % - Central bank's assets/GDP in 2007, %. 
Central bank assets are computed as the sum of IFS lines 11, 12a, 12e and 12s. 
Where 12s is not available, it is computed as the sum of IFS lines 12b, 12c, 12d 
and 12g. Where 2009 values were not available, 2008 values were used.  
IMF IFS 
International Reserves 
less Gold, % of GDP, 
2007 
International Reserves, less gold in current US dollars in 2007, expressed as 
percentage of GDP (in current US dollars) in 2007 
World Bank WDI 
    
    
    
    
    
        
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHI) 
Sum of squared shares of top 50 firms in industry assets. Individual firm data was 
collected from bankscope on all banks (commercial, savings, cooperative and 
islamic), bank holding companies and investment banks. Consolidated statements 
were used where available. Bankscope provides data on individual firms and to 
compute the share of each firm in industry assets, the firm level data was 
aggregated for each country-year observation. The coverage of bankscope data is 
uneven, due to which some filters were applied.  First, wherever BIS data on 
industry assets was available (and larger than bankscope totals), the BIS data was 
used. Second, (country-year) observations where industry assets or number of 
banks available were less than the 1st percentile of all observations were 
dropped. Third, observations for which there were extreme changes in number of 
banks or industry assets (outside the (1 99) percentile range) were dropped. For 
example, if the number of banks in the next year jumped by an extremely large 
value, the current year's observations were dropped, but if the next year's number 
of banks was unusually lower than the current year's then the next year's 
observations were dropped. The percentiles were defined for the whole sample 
(all country-year observations). Finally, the same extreme value and extreme 
changes filters were applied to the HHI. In cases where the resulting HHI series 
had gaps, the data was interpolated using linear interpolation. 
BvDep's Bankscope 
database and Bank for 
International 
Settlements 
Net Capital Inflows 
Reversal  
See D. Net Capital Inflows/GDP   
Net Interest Margins, 
2007 
Average net interest margin in banking sector  Beck et. al (2009) 
Net Portfolio Inflows 
Reversal 
See D. Net Portfolio Inflows/GDP   
Offshore Financial 
Center (OFC) or Tax 
haven 
OFC data from IMF "Offshore Financial Centers: The Assessment Program -- An 
Update" March 12, 2004 and tax havens from "Offshore Pariahs?" by Mark P. 
Hampton and John Christensen" in World Development 2002 
IMF and World 
Development, 2002 
    
    
        
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Peak EMP  The maximum value attained by the monthly exchange market pressure (EMP) 
index between 2007 and 2008. EMP is defined as the percentage depreciation in 
SDR exchange rate + fall in SDR value of foreign exchange reserves less gold, as 
percentage of the monetary base.  
IMF IFS 
Peak to Trough fall in 
Bank Equity Index 
(Peak value of banking sector equity price index between 2007 and 2009 - trough 
value of banking sector equity price index between 2007 and 2009)*100/Peak 
value of banking sector equity price index between 2007 and 2009.   Where 
banking sector equity price index was not available, a financial sector equity 
index was used.  
Thomson Financial 
Datastream 
Peak to Trough fall in 
Stock Index 
(Peak value of stock market price index between 2007 and 2009 - trough value of 
stock market price index between 2007 and 2009)*100/Peak value of stock 
market price index between 2007 and 2009 
Thomson Financial 
Datastream 
Private Credit by 
Deposit Money Banks, 
% of GDP, 2007 
  Beck et. al (2009) 
Recovery in Bank 
Equity Index 
(Post-Crisis Peak (between the crisis trough date and July 7, 2010) in bank equity 
index -  trough value of bank equity index (between 2007 and 2009) )*100/trough 
value of bank equity index 
Thomson Financial 
Datastream 
Recovery in Stock 
Index 
(Post-Crisis Peak (between the crisis trough date and July 7, 2010) in stock index 




Regulatory Quality  Captures perceptions of the ability of government to formulate and implement 





Interaction term between International Reserves less Gold, % of GDP, 2007 and 
Swap Line 
 
Stock Market Value 
Traded, % of GDP, 
2007 
  World Bank WDI Variable Name  Description  Source 
(Short Term External 
Debt -Reserves)/GDP, 
%, 2007 
  World Bank WDI 
Swap Line  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country was a recipient of a swap line by the 
Federal Reserve, European Central Bank or the People's Bank of China 
Aizenman et. al. (2010) 
(Total External Debt -
Reserves)/GDP, %, 
2007 
Total external debt equals total debt liabilities (portfolio debt + other investment) 
from LMF. If missing, then we used total external debt from EDJH database.  
Reserves are international reserves less gold, from LMF. GDP is from WDI. All 
variables are in current US dollars and as of or as of the end of 2007. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(LMF), External Debt 
Joint Hub (EDJH) and 
WDI 
Trade, % of GDP, 
2007 
Trade/GDP in 2007, expressed as a percentage  World Bank WDI 
Note: IMF IFS refers to International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database and World Bank WDI refers to World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  